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A CASE FOR JURY DETERMINATION OF SEARCH AND
SEIZURE LAW
Ronald J. Bacigal*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a criminal case the option to return a general verdict of acquittal invests the jury with the raw power to nullify many legal
determinations, including the trial judge's ruling that a search is
constitutional.1 While courts grudingly acknowledge the existence
of an extra-legal jury nullification power,2 courts do not recognize
any jury prerogative to determine the lawfulness of a search. The
United States Supreme Court's discussion of the jury's role in interpreting and applying the fourth amendment consists of one
terse statement that the legality of a search "is a question of fact
and law for the court and not for the jury."3 In challenging that
statement, this article draws a sharp line between de facto jury
nullification power and the jury's legitimate prerogative to determine law.
At present, nullification power can only be exercised in the rare
case where the jury fortuitously learns of the full circumstances
surrounding a search. For example, in a prosecution for criminal
sexual activity, suppose the government offers the testimony of a
police officer who observed the activity occurring in the defen* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S. Concord
College, 1964; LL.B., Washington & Lee University, 1967.

1. See generally H.

KALVEN

& H.

ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY,

318-323 (1966).

2. Nullification power exists because the judiciary is unable or unwilling to eliminate general verdicts. See notes 36 and 149 infra.
3. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925). See also Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927).
4. Most authorities distinguish between the jury's power to determine law through nullification and the jury's right to determine law. I have substituted the term "prerogative" for
"right" because the word "right" connotes a correlative duty in Hohfeldian analysis. See
Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913); Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919). While not
totally satisfied with the word prerogative, I feel that it better describes the legitimate
power of juries to interpret law.
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dant's bedroom. Suppose further that inquiry into the specific
competency of the observer reveals the circumstances of the observation: the police officer used binoculars to peer through a crack in
the window curtains. If sufficiently offended by the police conduct
the jury can acquit the defendant and thereby effectively nullify
the trial-judge's ruling that the police observation was lawful.5
In the above hypothetical, the jury acquires knowledge of the
search somewhat fortuitously because with a slight change of facts
the very same police observation would never come to light at the
trial on the merits. For example, suppose that after observing the
bedroom through binoculars, the police obtain a search warrant,
enter the bedroom and apprehend the defendant while engaged in
the criminal act. e If, at the suppression hearing, the judge upholds
the issuance of the warrant, the jury will only hear that the police
entered the bedroom pursuant to a valid warrant. Since the jury is
not authorized to consider the legality of the search, the jury will
never learn that the police initially used binoculars to look into a
citizen's bedroom. This second hypothetical is the more common
occurrence because juries rarely learn the full underlying circumstances of a search.7 Even when the jury is fully aware of the facts
surrounding a search, it is instructed to accept the legal determinations of the judge. Many law enforcement procedures of questionable legality do not shock the jury to the point that they defy the
judge's instructions.8 Thus, under the present system, jury nullification of searches deemed lawful by the judiciary is the exception.
This article states the case for a procedure which would make
the exception the rule by authorizing the jury to supplement the
judge's ruling with its own determination as to the legality of the
search. The trial judge's preliminary ruling on the admissibility of
5. At this point it is immaterial whether the trial judge ruled that the initial police observation was a reasonable search, or was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974).
7. I do not assert that searches pursuant to a warrant are more common than warrantless
searches. Just the opposite is true. See Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of
Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CriM. L.C. & P.S. 198 (1977).
8. "It is unlikely that the jury would let any manner of criminal run loose just for the
thrill of defying the judge." Scheflin, Jury Nullification:The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 168, 211 (1972).
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the fruits of a search would be final and unreviewable by the jury
only if the search is deemed unconstitutional. If the judge finds the
search lawful and admits the fruits in evidence, the jury would
hear all relevant evidence relating to the circumstances of the
search. The jury would then be instructed as follows:
Members of the Jury, you are the final judges of the lawfulness of
the search in this case. So whatever I tell you about the law, while it
is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper verdict
in the case, it is not binding upon you as members of the jury and
you may determine the law as you apprehend it to be in the case.
You may consider the evidence produced by the search only if you
determine that the search was reasonable within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. If you find the search to be unreasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment you must disregard all evidence produced by the search.9
Such an approach to the fourth amendment is analogous to the
Massachusetts rule govering the admission of confessions, ° and
has historical precedent in colonial American practice. Historically,
jury nullification and jury determination of law are necessarily intertwined and cannot be entirely separated. But in attempting to
maintain the conceptual distinction between jury prerogative and
jury power, this article presents evidence that colonial juries exercised the prerogative to determine law when reviewing the search
activities of Royal Customs inspectors. Indeed, Parliament's efforts
to eliminate this jury prerogative proved to be one of the causes of
the American Revolution. 1

9. This instruction is a modification of the Maryland instruction on the jury's prerogative
to determine substantive criminal law. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
10. See generally ANNOT., 1 A.L.R. 3d 1251 (1965). See also note 78 infra.
11. The Declaration of Rights and Grievances of the First Continental Congress and the
Declaration of Independence both include the grievance that establishment of the vice-admiralty courts in colonial America deprived the colonists of the right to trial by jury. See
generally C. UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY CouRTS AND THE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION 209
(1960).
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THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR JURY DETERMINATION OF SEARCH
AND SEIZURE LAW

Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or judicary department, I would say it is better
to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is
more important than the making of them.
-Thomas Jefferson12
"American histories without exception list Writs of Assistance as
one of the active causes of the American Revolution.""3 The writs
were first issued in America in 17554 and the major historical

studies of the fourth amendment1 5 begin their analysis of colonial
searches and seizures with James Otis's famous challenge of the
writs in Paxton's case (1761).16 During the period between 1761
and 1776 the colonial courts and legislatures, as well as private attorneys such as James Otis and John Adams, were actively involved in the Writs of Assistance controversy. American juries,
however, had been effectively removed from participation in the
controversy by England's creation of juryless Vice-Admiralty
courts in the colonies. Events which serve as precedent for the
jury's determination of search and seizure law occurred during the
neglected period of 1661-1764, when customs officials first searched
and seized pursuant to the Navigation Acts. It is during this period
that American juries played an active role in the search and seizure
controversy.
12. Howe, Juries as Judges of CriminalLaw, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to L'Abbe' Arnold (July 19, 1789)), reprinted in 3 WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 81-82 (Wash. ed. 1854).
13. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution in THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (R. Morris ed. 1939).

14. Id.
15. J. LANDYNSEi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME Counti (1966); N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937) (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Sciences VoL 55);
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL IrrsPRErATION (1969).
16. John Adams would later state "that Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs of Assistance
breathed into this nation the breath of life .... Then and there the child Independence
was born." LASSON, supra note 15 at 59.
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The Navigation Acts

In the mid-seventeenth century, Holland, not England, was the
commercial, industrial, and financial center of Europe. Under a
system of free trade, American commerce naturally would have
gravitated to the Netherlands. The Navigation Acts of 1660 and
1663 were designed to bind American trade to the mother country
and keep the colonies "in a firmer dependence" upon England. 17
The first of the Navigation Acts, the Enumeration Act of 1660,18
provided that goods imported to, or exported from, America be
shipped in English or American vessels and further provided that
certain enumerated colonial products, most importantly sugar and
tobacco, could only be shipped to England or another colony. The
second Navigation Act, the Staples Act of 1663,19 specified that all
goods imported to America be loaded in England.
These first two Navigation Acts were part of a general effort to
establish the Crown's firm control over all colonial activity and
government. During Oliver Cromwell's reign, the American colonies had not been subjected to close supervision or regulation, but
with the restoration of the English monarchy, the Crown turned its
attention to America. The Puritans of Massachusetts Bay Colony
objected to increased regulation on the grounds that they were
subject of the English King only to the extent that they voluntarily
established themselves as subjects by the terms of the colony's
charter.2 0 In an effort to resolve this "home rule" controversy,
Charles H sent a commission to induce the colonies to accept the
same political compromises that had been reached in England
upon the restoration of the Monarchy. The commission was a total
17. "The requirement that goods pass through England imposed many obligations upon
colonial trade in the guise of taxes, fees, cooperage, porterage, brokerage, warehouse rent,
commissions, extra merchant's profits, and the like, which would never have been incurred
in a direct trade with the ultimate market." Harper, The Effect of the Navigation Acts on
the Thirteen Colonies in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 32 (R. Morris ed. 1939).
18. 12 Car. II, C.18 (1660). See also Harper, supra note 17.
19. 15 Car. H, C.7 (1663). See also Harper, supra note 17.
20. See generally 1 I. HuTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (Boston 1764). Although the "home rule" controversy was most prominent in

Massachusetts, it was also present in other colonies. For example, in 1701 William Penn
wrote: "Are we comme 3000 miles into a desert... to have only the same privileges we had
at home?" Quoted in M. HALL, EDWARD RANDOLPH AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1676-1703,
at 223 (1969).
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failure. No compromise was reached, and the Navigation Acts were
largely ignored or evaded. 1
The third Navigation Act, the Plantation Duty Act of 1673,22 did
not impose any significant new duties or restrictions upon trade
but was designed solely to enforce the provisions of the first two
Navigation Acts. Edward Randolph, whose biography is a microcosm of the history of search and seizure during this period, 3 was
appointed Collector of Plantation Duty. He arrived in the colonies
in 1679 determined to enforce the Navigation Acts. Randolph's
principle method of enforcement was the seizure of vessels suspected of violating the Navigation Acts,24 and from 1680 to 1682
Randolph seized and prosecuted thirty-six ships for such violations. All but two of the alleged offenders were acquitted, and the
two convictions were obtained only when there was a trial without
a jury.2 The juries' refusal to convict for alleged violations of the
Navigation Acts should not be viewed as merely an example of jury
nullification of the unpopular Navigation Acts. While nullification
probably played a part in the decisions,2 e it is not the only explanation, in light of two legal objections raised against Randolph's
seizures and the role of the jury in passing upon those objections.
The first of these legal objections had overtones of nullification
theory as it involved a fusion of positive law and "higher law" concepts. The exponents of home rule argued that the Navigation
21. HALL, supra note 20, at 13-14.
22. 25 Chas. II, C.7 (1673). See also HARPER, supra note 17, and HALL, supra note 20.
23. "In England the customs establishment was elaborate. In New England it was one
man, Edward Randolph.... ." HALL, supra note 20, at 56.
24. The owner of the seized vessel could not remove either his ship or its cargo until the
case was tried. A conviction resulted in total forfeiture of the ship and cargo.
25. HALL, supra note 20, at 57.
26. Colonial juries "were alleged to consist of merchants or masters of ships." J. SMITH,
APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 60 n.390 (1950). However,
the possibility of nullification should not be over-emphasized as this was not yet the age of
tea parties, physical recapture of seized vessels, and mob violence. See note 66 infra and
accompanying text. Not all forms of resistance to the unpopular Navigation Acts were condoned by colonial juries. See, e.g., The case of the Two Sisters where a colonial merchant
vessel fired upon the customs inspectors. The merchant was acquitted of a violation of the
Navigation Acts but was convicted and fined for obstructing the customs officials in the
course of their duties. Reported in HALL, supra note 20, at 62.
27. In its most elementary form, jury nullification power rests on the maxim that positive
law must yield to "higher" laws such as natural law, God's law, an unwritten constitution,
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Acts were law in the colonies only to the extent that they were
accepted by the colonists. Thus determination of positive law in
America necessitated examination of the circumstances under
which a new and separate society is formed and is no longer bound
by the positive law of the old society.2 8 Ultimately the home rule
controversy was resolved against the colonies, and its influence
upon colonial juries is unclear. 29 The colonists ultimately prevailed,
however, on the second legal objection to Randolph's seizures, an
objection that may be characterized as a question of interpreting
positive law without resort to nullification power.
This latter objection conceded that the Navigation Acts were law
in America but asserted that Parliament, owing to legislative oversight, had empowered Randolph to enforce only the Plantation
Duty Act of 1673. Therefore, the colonial governors retained exclusive power to enforce the Enumeration Act and the Staples Act,
which were the real backbone of British control and the basis of all
of Randolph's seizures. When this purely positive law objection
was ultimately submitted to the Customs Commission in England,
the commission confessed its error and informed Randolph that he
"had noe more power to seize and prosecute . . . then any other
person."' Randolph sought to remedy this legal deficiency in his
seizure powers by obtaining letters of patent which explicitly authorized him to enforce all of the Navigation Acts. The letters of
patent were issued by the King, but the legal controversy in the
colonies continued, simply being recast in terms of whether the
King alone without Parliament could lawfully authorize such
seizures. Moderate colonial judges tended to recognize Randolph's
commission as sufficient warrant to seize, but colonial juries continued to render acquittals. 1
the social compact, current mores, etc. See generally Scheflin, supra note 8.
28. In theory the colonies were to follow English common law, in practice they developed
their own common law. A sizeable body of historians maintain that "the English common
law remained largely an alien system until the middle of the 18th Century .. " F. AuMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED PHASES 7 (1940).
29. If the colonial juries of this period considered whether the Navigation Acts or Randolph's seizures violated a "higher" law, such consideration was relatively primitive having
failed to reach the level of sophistication to which James Otis would bring the theory some
eighty years later in Paxton's case. See LAssoN, supra note 15.
30. HALL, supra note 20, at 66.
31. For example, in one famous case Governor Bradstreet, presiding as judge, sent out the
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On what basis did the colonial juries of the 1680's return acquittals? Ideally, de facto jury nullification of law should be separated
from jury determination of law. Absent special findings, 2 the actual basis of a general verdict of acquittal cannot be known. What
is known is that in rendering those general verdicts of acquittal the
colonial juries were not limited to an extra-legal nullification
power. The juries would have considered the argument that Randolph's seizures were illegal because those juries assumed that they
had a prerogative to determine the lawfulness of the seizures.
In practice, the colonial juries of the period determined all questions of law as Well as resolving factual disputes.s The judge's primary function was "to preserve order, and see that the parties had
a fair chance with the jury. ' 34 Such practice was based in part on

the practical considerations that most of that era's judges and advocates were without formal legal training, and in part upon the
35
colonists' deep resentment of professional judges and lawyers.
While colonial practice is clear regarding the jury's determination of law, colonial legal theory is less certain. It is difficult to
separate practice from theory regarding the authorized and
unauthozied acts of colonial juries, because the subtle distinction
between jury prerogative and jury nullification power was just becoming apparent at this time. Attaint, the punishment of the jury
for reaching an incorrect verdict, became obsolete in England with
the decision in Bushell's case in 1670.36 When the trial court lost
this means to coerce a verdict from the jury, it became apparent
jury three times with orders to reverse its findings. The jury refused to alter its verdict and
cast out the case on the ground that Randolph had no warrant to seize the ship. SMrTH,
supra note 26, at 61 n.400.
32. In civil cases there was considerable debate and confusion as to whether juries could
be compelled to render a special verdict, thereby leaving interpretation of law for the judge.
In criminal cases it was assumed that the jury had the right to render a general verdict. In
both civil and criminal cases the colonies insisted upon general verdicts and non-interference with jury prerogative. See, SMITH, supra note 26, at 359-60.
33. See generally Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1939).
34. Id. at 591. See also Eaton, The Development of the JudicialSystem in Rhode Island,
14 YALE L. J. 148 (1904-05).

35. The colonists of this age believed that any man of ordinary intelligence was able to
plead his own case and able to judge law and justice-not an unreasonable assumption in a
day when educated men were generally familiar with the law and its administration. See
AUMANN,

supra note 28.

36. 6 Howell's State Trials 999 (1670).

19811
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that the jury possessed the raw power to determine law by rendering an unreviewable general verdict of acquittal.
In England the question of whether the jury had not just the
power, but an authorized prerogative to determine law, was
presented by the controversy concerning seditious libel.3 7 The
question was not definitively resolved until 1792 when Parliament
enacted Fox's Libel Act.38 The Act authorized English juries to decide not just the "fact" of publication, but also the issue of
whether the publication was seditious which is in some sense a
mixed question of law and fact.
In colonial America, the jury's prerogative to determine the issue
of whether a publication was seditious was recognized as early as
1692 in Pennsylvania. 9 Perhaps the most famous example of an
American jury determining law as well as facts is this trial of John
Peter Zenger in 1 7 3 5 ."0 In areas of law other than libel cases,
American legal theory and practice also appears to have respected
the jury's prerogative to determine law. The records are spotty but
there is evidence that throughout the period from 1660 to the early
1800's the jury's determination of law was accepted theory and
practice. 4 ' In eliminating the jury's prerogative to determine law in
the later half of the nineteenth century, the American courts
looked to English precedent rather than to the American colonial
period. 2
Due to inadequate records and the inherent ambiguity of general
verdicts, the historical case for jury determination of search and
seizure law is not entirely conclusive.4 3 This much is clear: (1) the
37.
38.
39.
40.
yond

See generally Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 KAN. L. REV. 295 (1958).
52 Geo. III, c. 60 (1792).
Howe, supra note 33, at 594-95.
Zenger's defense council, Alexander Hamilton, argued that jurors "have the right beall dispute to determine the law and the facts. . . ." G. ALEXANDER, A BRmF NARRA-

TION OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER

41. See J. QUINCY

99 (1963).

REPORTS ON CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDICATED IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS

OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETwEEN

1761

AND

1772,

at app.

541-72 (1865). See generally Howe, supra note 33.

42. See generally Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
L.J. 170 (1964).
43. Legal materials from this period are so scanty that cautious historians ignore the period while the less cautious draw inferences with limited support. While I wish to avoid
"imagining the past," I confess to falling into the "less cautious" category.
YALE
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American colonies were confronted with significant search and
seizure questions some eighty years before the Writs of Assistance
controversy; (2) there were admitted legal deficiencies in the authority of customs officials to search and seize; (3) colonial juries
were duly informed of the legal deficiencies; (4) colonial juries decided disputed questions concerning such legal deficiencies. Thus,
it seems a fair inference that the acquittals rendered by colonial
juries were based, at least in part, upon their conclusion of law
that the seizures were illegal." What is also clear is England's
strong and hostile reaction to the colonial juries' exercise of their
prerogative to interpret law adversely to the Crown. Numerous acquittals in seizure cases led to repeated British efforts to negate
the role of the jury, and stubborn American efforts to preserve the
jury's function in the search and seizure controversy.
The difficulties with enforcement of the Navigation Acts were
soon overshadowed by the broader struggle regarding home rule
for Massachusetts. The struggle reached a climax in 1684 when
England vacated the colony's charter and dissolved the Massachusetts government.45 A temporary council was appointed to rule
Massachusetts with Edmund Randolph serving the council as Collector, Surveyor, and Searcher of Customs. Records are again
spotty, but it appears that Randolph had more success with
seizures under the temporary council than he had under the old
charter government. Whatever brief success Randolph had ended
when James II was displaced by the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Massachusetts revolted against the ruling council sent by James
and Randolph fled to England where he was reduced to working
the London docks as a "free-lance informer" receiving a percentage
of seized goods."
By the early 1690's William and Mary were secure on the English throne, Randolph was back in the good graces of the Crown,
and the Massachusetts charter was restored. With England relatively stable under William and Mary, attention was again directed
44. I make no claim that colonial juries were anticipating the modern exclusionary rule.
In acquitting defendants of violations of the Navigation Acts the jury did not face the issue
of freeing a "violent" criminal because the constable blundered. See note 26 supra.
45. See Hutchinson, supra note 20.
46. See HALL, supra note 20, at 134.
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to colonial trade and enforcement of the Navigation Acts. Randolph returned to America in 1692 as Surveyor General of America
and redirected his energies toward the southern colonies where he
could count on the cooperation of more friendly governors, but
Randolph had no more success with southern juries than he had
had with New England juries. 4'7 Randolph angrily reported to his
superiors: "I find that by the partiality of juries and others, that I
can obtain no cause for His Majesty upon the most apparent
evidences.

'48

Randolph's vehement reports on the widespread evasion of the
Navigation Acts led Parliament in 1696 to enact the fourth Navigation Act-An Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses
in the Plantation Trade. 49 This act was modeled on the English
Statute of Frauds (1662) with one major difference which would
prove to be one of the causes of the American Revolution. The
Navigation Act of 1696 authorized the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in America, and provided that suits for forfeiture of
vessels offending the Navigation Acts could be brought in "any of
His Majesty's Courts," a phrase apparently intended to include the
existing colonial common law courts and the newly created viceadmiralty courts.50 In England, however, such suits could only be
brought in the Courts of Exchequer."1 Unlike the vice-admiralty
courts, the Courts of Exchequer employed a jury. Thus the basis
was laid for what would become a major grievance of the colonists:
Americans were denied their traditional right to a jury trial, a right
still enjoyed by their fellow subjects in England.52
Although there were some incidental benefits to establishing the
47. One ship, The Providence,was prosecuted three times in Maryland and Virginia with-

out obtaining a conviction. Id. at 140.
48. Id. at 153.
49. See Harper, supra note 17, and UBBELOHDE, supra note 11.
50. The phrase was ultimately construed to invest the colonial common law courts and
the vice-admiralty courts with concurrent jurisdiction over violations of the Navigation
Acts. See UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 16.
51. See SMITH, supra note 26, at 93.

52. In 1701 William Penn wrote that to try Americans "without a jury, gives our people
the greatest discontent, looking upon themselves as less free here than at home, instead of
greater privileges, which were promised." Quoted in Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The
Case Against Admiralty Jurisdictionin America, 1764-1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q., 459, 462
(1959).
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vice-admiralty courts in America,5" Parliament's primary purpose
for establishing them was to negate the American jury's role in the
enforcement of the Navigation Acts.5 4 The American reaction to
the establishment of vice-admiralty courts was strong and immediate. In Pennsylvania, the legislature reacted with a statute stipulating that any case involving a violation of the Navigation Acts
5
must be tried according to the rules of common law before a jury 5
Many colonial judges reacted by issuing writs of prohibition
against proceedings in the vice-admiralty courts.5 8 Colonial juries
continued to address the seizure controversy as best they could in
the common law courts. Although the jury could no longer deal
directly with the forfeiture trial in the vice-admiralty court, it
could indirectly address the search and seizure controversy when a
civil suit was filed against a customs official for false arrest and
trespass in seizing a vessel. For example, in one Massachusetts case
the shipowner had agreed to pay a penalty of 500 pounds rather
than risk total forfeiture in the vice-admiralty court. The shipowner them promptly sued in a common law court for damages
against the customs official who had seized the vessel. The jury
53. In addition to proceeding in rem and by written deposition, the vice-admiralty courts
functioned throughout the year, as opposed to the limited terms of common law courts. The
constant availability of the vice-admiralty courts was important in maritime cases where the
parties were often transient and delays in judgment caused unusual hardships. See UBBELOHDE,

supra note 11, at 20-21.

54. The Tory position on the Fraud Act of 1696 was that American juries could not be
trusted to interpret the Acts of Trade impartially, thus "Parliament was justified in violating the rights of its subjects so that the Navigation Acts might be enforced." Lovejoy, supra
note 52, at 469.
55. HALL, supra note 20, at 184. The statute was disallowed by the English government in
1702. Id. at 185.
56. The common law courts in America were as jealous of their power as the English
common law courts had been during their historic struggle with the Admiralty courts. The
common law courts prevailed in England by narrowly defining the jurisdiction of the Admiralty courts and by issuing writs of prohibition whenever Admiralty exceeded its jurisdiction. American common law courts attempted to follow this precedent by issuing writs of
prohibition on the questionable grounds that by authorizing suits for forfeitures "in any of
His Majesty's courts" the Act of 1696 had conferred jurisdiction only upon courts of record,
which Admiralty courts were not. See SMITH, supra note 26, at 516. England conceded that
the American common law courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the vice-admiralty
courts, but maintained that the choice of forum belonged to the prosecutor, and thus writs
of prohibition did not properly lie. In 1742 Parliament rejected proposed legislation to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the vice-admiralty courts. Id. at 189. The writs of prohibition were
not definitively prohibited until the Sugar Act of 1764. See note 63 infra.
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awarded damages of 500 pounds against the customs officer,
thereby effectively negating the seizure. 5 This power of a civil jury
to reach the search and seizure issue, however indirectly, was not
eliminated until adoption of the Sugar Act in 1764.58
The period from the Fraud Act of 1696 to the Sugar Act of 1764
was a time of conflict between legal theory and actual practice.
Throughout the period England continued to expand the legal jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts, 59 while the colonies continued to evade the power of the vice-admiralty courts to enforce the
Navigation Acts. 60 By 1760 evasion of the Navigation Acts was an
accepted practice which "had come to be considered as almost legal trade." 1 Matters changed greatly in the 1760's and the history
of that period as well as the history of the writs of assistance controversy have been reported elsewhere in great detail.6 2
This brief historical survey has focused on the colonial jury's role
in the search and seizure controversy, a role which came to an end
57. UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 34-35.
58. 4 Geo. III, C.15 (1764). See note 63, infra. The Federalist Papers make passing reference to this power of a civil jury to control the conduct of revenue collectors. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 543 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1974).
59. In 1721 the American vice-admiralty courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over
trespasses against the forest preserves of the Royal Navy. This exposed western farmers, far
removed from ports and sea trade, to trial without a jury. See generally R. ALBION, FORESTS
AND SEA POWER: THE TIMBER PROBLEM OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1652-1862, at 231-74 (1926).
Until the very eve of the Revolution, Parliament continued to extend the jurisdiction of the
vice-admiralty courts. For example, the Molasses Act of 1733, the Stamp Act of 1765, and
the Townsend Acts of 1768 all extended the vice-admiralty courts' authority to interpret
and enforce commercial regulations. See generally UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 15-16, 76,
208.
60. In addition to widespread bribery and intimidation of customs inspectors, the colonists found other ways to negate the power of vice-admiralty courts. For example, powerful
leaders such as William Penn used their influence to have convictions reversed upon appeal
to England. See SMITH, supra note 26, at 178. The colonists could make life, socially and
financially, quite difficult for vice-admiralty judges who strictly enforced the Navigation
Acts. See Lovejoy, supra note 52, at 462-63. Most importantly, the colonists succeeded in
having native-born colonials appointed as judges of the vice-admiralty courts. These local
men, if not actually in league with the merchants, certainly understood and were sympathetic to the difficulties of commercial ventures in America. "The vice-admiralty courts had
originally been granted jurisdiction in determining violations of the acts of trade in an effort
to evade colonial juries. But this advantage was of little consequence if the judges were as
partial to the local merchants as the juries had been." UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 37.
61. LASSON, supra note 15, at 52.
62. See note 15 supra.
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with the adoption of the Sugar Act of 1764. The Act removed the
last vestige of the jury's rolb in search and seizure cases by precluding suits for false arrest against customs inspectors whenever
the vice-admiralty court certified that there had been probable
cause for the seizure. Henceforth, there were few opportunities
for juries to "lawfully" address the search and seizure controversy,
and juries were pushed more and more toward the exercise of raw
nullification power whenever they had any opportunity to express
themselves on the subject.6 4 Denied access to juries, colonists perceived themselves as without significant legal recourse against the
arbitrary and unlawful searches of customs officials. The legal battle against unlawful searches was left to those colonial judges who
refused to issue writs of assistance.6 The extralegal battle was carried on by the people through such measures as tea parties, tarring
and feathering of customs officers, physical recapture of seized ves67
sels, 66 and ultimately by revolution.
63. The Act further discouraged civil suits by placing the burden of proof on the shipowner and by directing that treble costs could be awarded against the shipowner. Also by
explicitly stating that prosecutions could be brought in common law courts or vice-admiralty courts at the election of the prosecutor, the Act precluded issuance of writs of prohibition against vice-admiralty proceedings. See note 56 supra. See also Lovejoy, supra note 52,
at 465.
64. E.g., defendants charged with tarring and feathering customs officers were frequently
acquitted by colonial juries. See generally Dickerson, supra note 13.
65. The colonial judiciary's reluctance to issue writs of assistance is often regarded as
another form of nullification of valid positive law. The assumption is that judges refused to
issue the writs on the basis of Otis's argument that the writs were contrary to natural law or
the British constitution. No doubt some colonial judges were sympathetic to the cause of
independence and used their power to nullify even legitimate efforts of the Crown. See UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 95. But in addition to Otis's more famous arguments on natural
and constitutional law, there were many purely "positive" law objections to the writs. "Tory
judges were just as determined opponents of general writs as were their Whig associates."
Dickerson, supra note 13, at 59.
66. Rescue of seized vessels had previously been "an accidental or occasional affair" but
soon became "the natural and certain consequence of a seizure." Governor Bernard of Massachusetts reporting to British Board of Trade (17_), quoted in UBBELOHDE, supra note 11,
at 93.
67. The grievance that vice-admiralty courts denied Americans the right to trial by jury is
listed in the Declaration of Rights and Grievances of the First Continental Congress and in
the Declaration of Independence. UBBELOHDE, supra note 11, at 209. The colonists' regard
for trial by jury is epitomized in a charge to the first grand jury convened by the newly
independent Commons of South Carolina.
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury: When, by evil inclinations tending to nothing less
than absolute tyranny, trials by jury have been discontinued, and juries, in discharge
of their duty, have assembled, and, as soon as met, as silently and arbitrarily dis-

1
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After the American Revolution the broad question of the jury's
prerogative to determine law and the specific development of
search and seizure law were never again joined as they had been in
colonial America. Jury determination of substantive law continued
to be a widespread practice through the 1850's, but was virtually
eliminated by the end of the century. 8 In some states the legislature eliminated the jury's prerogative to determine law, but in
most jurisdictions a judiciary, jealous of its own power, significantly curbed the jury's prerogatives.6 9 In the federal system, the
practice of permitting the jury to determine law was ended with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sparf and Hansen
70

v. United States.

Ironically, the end of jury prerogative to determine law occurred
at the very time that the development of fourth amendment law
was beginning. Sparf and Hansen was decided nine years after
Boyd v. United States,1 the first important United States Supreme Court decision on the fourth amendment. By the time the
Supreme Court considered a sizeable body of fourth amendment
cases in the 1920's, Sparf and Hansen was settled precedent.
Thus, when confronted with the assertion that the jury should determine the legality of a search, 2 the Court eschewed examination
of the history of search and seizure in America and merely cited a
civil case for the general proposition that the judge, not the jury,
determines the admissibility of evidence. 3 Only in Maryland has
the jury retained significant prerogatives to determine law, 4 and
missed without being impaneled, whereby, in contempt of Magna Carta, justice has

been delayed and denied; it cannot but afford to every good citizen the most sincere
satisfaction once more to see juries, as they now are, legally impaneled, to the end
that the laws may be duly administered. I do most heartily congratulate you upon so
important an event.
AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA
1026 (Force ed. U.S. Government, 1844).
68. See Howe, supra note 33; Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
69. See note 68 supra. See also Scheflin, supra note 8, at 207 n.134.
70. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
71. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
72. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925).
73. Gila Valley Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103 (1914). The exclusionary rule had been
adopted for the federal system in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
74. See generally Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REv.
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Maryland is the sole jurisdiction to give some consideration to the
role of the jury in determining modern day search and seizure law.
B.

The Maryland Cases

The Maryland Constitution has retained the colonial practice of
recognizing the jury as "the Judges of Law, as well as of fact." 5
Debates on the Maryland Constitutions of 1851 and 1857 reveal
opposing views on the practice of allowing the jury to determine
the admissibility of evidence. 76 Despite the confusion of the constitutional drafters, the Maryland Court of Appeals has followed the
general rule that the admission of evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. One acknowledged exception to this
general rule is that Maryland follows Massachusett's approach
which allows the jury to make the final determination of the admissibility of a confession.78 Whether the admission of the fruits of
a search is another situation where the jury determines admissibility has been the subject of several cases.
In 1950, the Maryland Court of Appeals first considered the
jury's role in search and seizure issues in Hubbard v. State.7 9 The
34 (1943); Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Law and Fact in Maryland, 52 MD.S.B.A. 184
(1947); Markel, Trial by Jury - A Two Horse Team or One Horse Teams?, 42 Mn. S.B.A. 72
(1937); Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the Practice be Continued?, 60 Mn.
S.B.A. 246 (1955).
75. Art. XV, § 5 of the Maryland Constitution provides in full: "In the trial of all criminal
cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass
upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction."
76. See Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 249 (1858). See generally Dennis, supra note 44, at

35.
77. Rasin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 138 A. 338 (1927).
78. Barnhart v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968). Maryland, like many adherents of Massachusetts' approach, often fails to distinguish between the jury's assessment of

the trustworthiness of the confession, and the jury's determination of voluntariness as a
standard of admissibility. The distinction is significant because trustworthiness and voluntariness are not identical. For example, an involuntary confession may be trustworthy if its

disclosures are confirmed by independent evidence. Conversely, the requirement that a confession be corroborated recognizes that a voluntary confession may not be trustworthy. See
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Equating voluntariness with trustworthiness
diminishes the utility of the voluntariness standard as a means of regulating police interrogation practices. See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859 (1979); Metzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 317 (1954).
79. 195 Md. 103, 72 A.2d 733 (1950).

1981]

JURY DETERMINATION

Court held that the question of lawful consent to a search was initially a question for the judge, but if the judge found the consent
lawful, the issue was submitted to the jury for their ultimate determination. Fifteen years later, in Wilson v. State,8 0 the court extended the jury's role to encompass consideration of whether there
was probable cause for an arrest. The Maryland Court of Appeals
has not addressed the issue since Wilson, but in recent cases the
Court of Special Appeals has taken a strong stand against the
jury's determination of the legality of a search.
In Price v. State8 1 the Court of Special Appeals noted in dicta
that the past practice of submitting the question of probable cause
to a jury may have accorded the defendant "more than that to
*.".., That dicta became the holding of
which he was entitled .
83
upheld the trial court's refusal to inwhich
v.
State
Cleveland
struct the jury that "if the arrest of the defendant was illegal the
articles seized as incident thereto were improperly admitted into
evidence and cannot be considered by you."' " Cleveland distinguished Hubbard and Wilson on the basis that the subsequent enactment of Maryland Rule 72985 invested the trial judge with exclusive power to determine the admissibility of evidence. While
Cleveland left open the question of whether consent searches are
governed by Rule 729 or by the rules for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Johnson v. State8" subsequently held that
consent searches, like all other forms of search, are governed by
Rule 729 and the judge's ruling on the lawfulness of the search is
final.
Cleveland and Johnson are disappointing in that the Court of
Special Appeals placed great reliance on Maryland Rule 729 and
did not address the general benefits and drawbacks of allowing the
jury to play a role in search and seizure law. The Court of Special
Appeals recently submitted this issue to its noted fourth amend80. 235 Md. 245, 210 A.2d 824 (1965).

81. 7 Md. App. 131, 254 A.2d 219 (1969).
82. Id. at -, 254 A.2d at 226.
83. 8 Md. App. 204, 259 A.2d 73 (1969).
84. Id. at -, 259 A.2d at 75.
85. 8 Md. App. 204, 259 A.2d 73 (discussing portions of the rule and the courts' interpretation thereof).
86. 30 Md. App. 280, 352 A.2d 349 (1976).
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ment scholar, Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. whose opinion in Ehrlich v. State 7 expands upon the analysis of the earlier Maryland
cases. Judge Moylan's objections to the jury's determination of
search and seizure law will be considered in the latter part of this
article which shifts focus from the jury's historical role to modern
day considerations. 8
While jury determination of search and seizure law remains a
viable issue in Maryland,8" in all other jurisdictions such a role for
the jury would probably have to be created by the legislature. The
remainder of this article is addressed to legislative bodies, and considers the benefits of creating such a role, and whether such a procedure can pass constitutional scrutiny.9 0
III. THE MODERN DAY CASE FOR JURY DETERMINATION OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

LAW

"A jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it should
receive from the court."
-Sparf and Hansen v. United States1
"The jury want to know whether that ar what you told us, when we
first went out, was raly the law, or whether it was only jist your
notion."
-Foreman of a Nineteenth Century Jury92
A.

Introduction

Since this article focuses on a role for the jury in determining
search and seizure law, there is no need to unduly lengthen the
article with a detailed account of the judiciary's development of
fourth amendment law. A cursory examination of the basic meth87. 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371 (1979).
8. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
89. The Maryland Court of Appeals has not considered the issue since 1965. See Wilson
v. State, 239 Md. 245, 210 A.2d 824 (1965).
90. The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the Maryland Constitution's recognition of juries as judges of law "but has failed to intimate doubts about the
constitutionality of the provision." Wilkins v. State, 16 Md. App. 587, _,
300 A.2d 411,
420-21 (1973). See also Wyley v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 744 (4th Cir.
1967).
91. 156 U.S. at 63 (1895) (quoting the trial court's instruction to the jury).

92. Howe, supra note 33 at 582 (quoting FORD,

HISTORY OF ILLINOIs

84 (1854)).
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odology the courts use in interpreting the amendment and discussion of whether use of that methodology is within the exclusive
dominion of the judiciary is appropriate.
Traditionally, the major issues of fourth amendment litigation
were seen as falling into four distinct categories: (1) the scope of
the amendment, i.e., the circumstances in which the protections of
the amendment come into play versus the situation where the
amendment is totally inapplicable; 93 (2) the standards of the
amendment, i.e., determination of what factors make a search constitutionally reasonable or unreasonable;94 (3) the consequences of
fourth amendment violations, i.e., determination of when the exclusionary rule applies; 95 and (4) standing to raise fourth amendment questions, i.e., identification of who is entitled to invoke the
protections of the amendment.9 6
At least since Katz v. United States,9 7 the distinct nature of
those four categories is highly doubtful. Prior to Katz the scope of
the amendment was held to cover a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area.9 8 Katz was clear in overturning this standard, but in its stead Katz offered only a nebulous new standard of
protecting "those expectations of privacy which society recognizes
as reasonable."9 9 Recent Supreme Court opinions contain interesting variations of the Katz standard as the Court refers to the scope
of the amendment in terms of "reasonable," 10 0 "justifiable," 10 1 or
"legitimate"10 2 expectation of privacy. The various formulations of
93. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Moylan, The
Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. the Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected
Threshold of 'So What?', 1977 S. IhL. L.J. 75.
94. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See generally Bacigal, The
Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1980 ILL. L.F. 763.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See generally Schrock and
Welsh, Up From Calandra:The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59
MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See generally Knox, Some Thoughts
on the Scope of the FourthAmendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures,
40 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1975).
97. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
99. 389 U.S. at 351.
100. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
101. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
102. 439 U.S. at 140-49.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:791

the Katz standard may be significant in that defining the standard
as a matter of reasonableness, justifiability, or legitimacy, has a
bearing upon the methodology used to determine the10 standard
and
3
upon the issue of who is the proper decisionmaker.
At present, the Court asserts that it is the appropriate and exclusive decision maker and appears satisfied that Katz posed the
correct question. "Our problem," Justice White said, "is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable'-what expectations the fourth amendment will protect.... ,

However, the

Court has never articulated the methodology it employs to resolve
this problem. Justice Harlan proposed the familiar methodology of
judicial balancing. Determining whether the amendment applies to
a particular government activity requires an assessment of the
"impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the
utility of the [government's] conduct as a technique of law enforcement." 10 5 The Court has not openly adopted Justice Harlan's balancing approach, but instead has frequently avoided determination
of the scope of the amendment by subsuming the scope inquiry
1
within the question of fourth amendment standards. 0
In determining the standards for a constitutional search the Justices have been engaged in a long standing controversy over the
relationship of the amendment's two conjunctive clauses: the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.107 Originally, the
Court's fourth amendment analysis focused upon the warrant
clause requirement of probable cause as the substantive justification for a constitutional search. Probable cause was most often referred to as a fixed standard which applied uniformly whenever the
amendment applied.10 8 Under this view the warrant clause was
dominant, and while the reasonableness clause could excuse the
103. See text accompanying note 182 infra.
104. 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added).

105. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. The Court has also avoided the scope question by creating an irregular version of the
assumption of the risk concept. See generally Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on
the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. W. L. REv. 529, 537 (1978).

107. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For a history of the controversy, see Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the "Search Incident"
Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047 (1975).

108. See Bacigal, supra note 94, at 767.
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absence of a warrant in certain situations, the reasonableness
clause could
not authorize a search in the absence of probable
109
cause.
The Court, however, subsequently placed increased emphasis on
the reasonableness clause in defining the substantive requirements
1 Reasonableness was seen as the ultifor a constitutional search. 10
mate standard for a constitutional search, and unlike the comparatively rigid definition of probable cause, reasonableness was to be
determined from "the total atmosphere of the case." ' Reasonableness as a flexible standard and probable cause as a comparatively rigid and uniform standard represent very distinct views of
the fourth amendment. But the two standards have lost their distinctiveness with the Court's defacto recognition of a sliding scale
of probable cause which imports into the warrant clause standard
the flexibility that previously had been unique to the reasonableness standard.
In Camera v. Municipal Court112 and Terry v. Ohio11 3 the Court
abandoned all pretense that probable cause was a fixed and uniform standard deduced from virtually absolute principles enshrined in the Constitution. The Court adopted the view that the
probable cause standard is a compromise for accommodating the
opposing interests of the government and individual citizens, and
recognized that the same compromise is not called for in all situations. This concept of a variable standard of probable cause is
every bit as flexible and nebulous as the reasonableness standard. 4 In fact, despite the Court's protest to the contrary,1 5 the
109. "In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court [he has] probable cause." Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
110. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) with Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
111. 339 U.S. at 66.
112. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
113. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
114. In place of a rigid definition of probable cause as a "reasonable belief," the Court
now uses such terms as "reasonable suspicion," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878-84 (1975) and "clear indication," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
The lower courts have referred to the required level of probable cause as: "real suspicion,"
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967); "some knowledge," Belfare v.
United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1966); "mere possibility," People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.
3d 710, 739, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 (1972); and "non-whimsical suspi-
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two standards are essentially the same. The Court employs one
methodology, balancing conflicting governmental and individual
interests, to determine whether a search is constitutional. It simply
makes no difference whether the balancing is done to determine
what is reasonable or to determine what level of probable cause is
required.
The flexibility of the balancing approach to fourth amendment
standards has also tended to subsume the threshold question of
the amendment's scope. The Court eschews rigorous analysis of the
scope of the amendment in order to reach the question of fourth
amendment standards where the Court may engage in its new
found freedom to weigh and balance any number of relevant fac11
tors. For example, in United States v. Mendenhall
only two
members of the majority addressed the issue of whether a seizure
had taken place. The three concurring Justices were willing to assume that a seizure occurred, and confined their consideration to
117
whether the standard of reasonable suspicion had been met.
Mendenhall follows the approach of Wyman v. James'1 8 in that
the Court allows itself alternative expressions of a single determination. That is, the standard of the amendment is met because the
government interest is deemed sufficient to set aside privacy or, in
the terminology of the scope inquiry, the privacy interest is
deemed insufficient to trigger fourth amendment protection.
Adoption of this flexible balancing approach merges not only the
questions of the scope and standards of the fourth amendment,
but also the previously distinct categories of standing to invoke the
cion," People v. DeBaur, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219, 352 N.E.2d 562, 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 382
(1976). Of course the important constitutional consideration is the distinction between mere
suspicion and reasonablesuspicion, or between mere belief and reasonablebelief. The concept of reasonableness is the significant legal determination; references to belief, suspicion
and justification are surplusage.
115. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
116. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
117. Id. at 560 (concurring opinion).
118. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman's primary holding that no fourth amendment intrusion
occurred is set out in a single paragraph which contains no citation of authority. Id. at 31718. The majority opinion then devotes nine pages to discussion of the reasonableness of a
search if the Court "were to assume that a caseworker's home visit,. . . somehow. . . and
despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense .... " Id. at 318. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).

19811

JURY DETERMINATION

813

amendment's protections and the application of the exclusionary
rule. Prior to Rakas v. Illinois' 9 the Court had formulated rules of
standing which were not necessarily tied to expectations of privacy
and the balancing approach. 120 However, in Rakas, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Katz's expectation of privacy formulation
should be the sole standard for determining standing to invoke
fourth amendment protections. With the recent decisions of
United States v. Salvucci'2' and Rawlings u. Kentucky,122 the
traditional standing inquiry has been subsumed within the scope
question of whether the search infringed upon an interest of the
defendant which the amendment was designed to protect. Thus
the question of fourth amendment standing has been subsumed
within the question of the amendment's scope, which in turn has
been subsumed within the question of reasonable standards.
Justice White, dissenting in Rakas, argued that the majority had
undercut the substantive protection of the fourth amendment in
its desire to reduce the operation of the amendment's exclusionary
rule. 2 3 In fact the Court's approach to the exclusionary rule is but
another aspect of the balancing approach which has come to dominate all fourth amendment considerations. Whatever the original
basis of the amendment's exclusionary rule, 2 4 the present Court
regards the rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal right of the party aggrieved.' ' 25 Thus
when not clearly bound by precedent 26 the Court views itself as
free to apply or not apply the exclusionary rule depending upon
119. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
120. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See generally The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv.L. REv. 62, 171 (1979).
121. 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980).
122. 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556 (1980).
123. 439 U.S. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting).
124. In Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court referred to deterrence, judicial
integrity, and the intimate relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments. See generally Schrock and Welsh, supra note 95; Note, Formalism,Legal Realism, and Constitutionally ProtectedPrivacy Under the Fourthand Fifth Amendments, 90 HAV. L. REV. 945
(1977).
125. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
126. The Chief Justice appears willing to overturn Mapp if certain conditions are met.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the results of balancing the benefits of deterrence against the costs
of excluding relevant and trustworthy evidence. 2 '
There seems little point in separating fourth amendment concepts of scope, standards, standing, and consequences when the
Court resolves all of these issues by resort to the single method of
flexible case-by-case balancing of individual and governmental interests.' 2s Taken to its logical end the Court's balancing approach
to the fourth amendment reduces all inquiries to two related fundamental questions: (1) how much and what type of privacy does a
reasonably free society require; and (2) how much and what type
of intrusion upon privacy is required to further a reasonably ordered society?129 Of course the fourth amendment is not unique in
posing such fundamental questions. All public law issues are reducible to a balancing of individual and governmental interests for
the good of society. 30 Framing the questions in such abstractions
is not particularly helpful when deciding specific cases, but it does
illustrate the basic questions which confront the Court. The
Court's institutional role in addressing such questions remains an
important and controversial subject in our democratic society.'
However, rather than restate the arguments over judicial
supremacy, this article accepts that the Court does and will continue to balance conflicting interests for the perceived general good
of society. With that assumption, the article considers a possible
interaction between the Court's role and a proposed role for the
jury in determining search and seizure law.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). See also, Justice Brennan's

dissenting opinion in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980). In fifth amendment
cases the Court distinguishes between the exclusion of unreliable evidence, and the exclusion of trustworthy evidence for the extrinsic purpose of deterring police "misconduct." See
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See also note 78 supra.

128. One commentator suggests that the Court has abandoned all attempts at principled
analysis of the fourth amendment in favor of resolving individual cases according to the
"fundamental fairness" approach of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Yackle, The
Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 427 (1978).

129. The issues raised under the fourth amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic
dilemma of order vs. liberty in a democratic state." LANDYNSKI, supra note 15, at 13.

130. See, e.g., Justice Jackson's description of the Bill of Rights as "the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the
maintenance of organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).

131. See, e.g., Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TExAs L. REV. 1361 (1979).
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B. The Court's Role
In Sparf and Hansen v. United States3 2 the majority did not
deny that federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices sitting
on circuit, had frequently instructed juries that they were "the
judges both of the law and fact in a criminal case and are not
bound by the opinion of the court ... -13 In eliminating this

practice Sparf and Hansen followed the principles of Marbury v.
Madison1 34 by placing the determination of law within the exclusive dominion of the judiciary. It is thus necessary to examine
Sparf and Hansen's holding, and the role the judiciary envisioned
for itself.
The majority in Sparf and Hansen partially relied upon a distinction between questions of law and fact, a distinction of limited
utility. Law/fact denominations are generally no more than
convenient labels for characterizing which questions are for the
jury and which are for the court, and as such the denominations
are answers, not analysis. 3 5 The utility of the law/fact distinction
is especially doubtful in the fourth amendment context. The reasonableness of a search is often referred to as a factual question, l"'
and the Court has characterized reasonableness as a mixed question of law and fact.13 7 Even if the reasonableness of a search is
denominated a purely legal question, or a constitutional fact, the
Court has permitted juries to resolve other constitutionally significant questions.13 8 Legal concepts such as obscenity are so amorphous as to be devoid of all meaning except that given to them by
a jury.
132. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
133. United States v. Wilson, Fed. Cas. No. 16,730 (C.C.E.P. Pa. 1830).
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
135. See generally Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1303 (1942).
136. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) referred to reasonableness as
turning upon the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life ......
137. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925).
138. The most obvious example is the jury's determination of community standards in
obsenity cases. See SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrry 149 (1976); Comment, The Jury's Role
In Criminal Obscenity Cases - A Closer Look, 28 KAN. L. REV. 111 (1979). The jury plays a
less well defined, but nonetheless significant, role in the determination of whether the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. See Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment: A Quest for Balance Between Legal & Societal Morality, LAw & POLcY Q.
285, 285-335 (July, 1979).
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The law/fact distinction is also misleading because criminal trials normally involve three kinds of issues: (1) questions of law; (2)
questions of fact; and (3) questions of the application of a legal
standard to the facts. 13 9 This third issue is often determined by the
jury. It is a rare criminal case where the jury does not deal with
concepts such as insanity, adequate provocation, criminal negligence or some aspects of the reasonably prudent man concept. 140
To determine what a prudent person would have done under the
facts of the case is to define particularly the legal standard which
the defendant's conduct must meet in order to escape criminal responsibility. In short, the law is most often stated as a general rule
and "the jury in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general
rule of law to the justice of the particular case." 41
Most importantly, Sparf and Hansen's somewhat illusory distinction between law and fact is relevant only upon acceptance of
the premise which underlies claims of judicial supremacy-that it
is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."'142 For example, in rejecting a role for Maryland juries
in resolving search and seizure issues Judge Moylan asserted: "In a
criminal case, the only issue for the jury is that of guilt or innocence. Anything that does not bear upon guilt or innocence is utterly foreign to the only task assigned to the jury.1 143 In typically
colorful fashion, Judge Moylan went on to state that "[tihe jury is
assigned the sole mission of determining 'Whodunnit?' ",144 From
this premise Judge Moylan reasoned that since the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule serves the extrinsic purpose of deterring
police misconduct and does not enhance the fact-finding process,
"[i]t is not the function of the jury-'to police the police' by denying
itself probative evidence. 1 4 5 While the internal structure of such a
139. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 501 (1969).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, J., concurring). See generally James & Sigerson, ParticularizingStandards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1952).
141. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 Am.JUD. SOC. 166, 170 (1929).
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
143. Ehrlick v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, -, 403 A.2d 371, 376 (1979).
144. Id. at -, 403 A.2d at 377. Judge Moylan's view of the jury's fact-finding function is
widely shared by the judiciary. See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3rd
Cir. 1973).
145. 42 Md. App. at -, 403 A.2d at 377.
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syllogism cannot be faulted, the premise can be challenged.
The constitutional framers did not perceive the sole mission of
the jury as resolution of "Whodunnit?"14 The prevailing view at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout the
first half of the nineteenth century was that the jury was a main147
stay of liberty and an integral part of democratic government.

The common man in the jury box, just as the citizen in the voting
booth, was seen as a central ingredient of a democratic theory that
asserted the sovereignty of the people through self-government.
Throughout our country's history the jury's exercise of nullification
power has been the most dramatic manner of rejecting the limited
role of determining "Whodunnit?" The acquittal rates for prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act

48

and Prohibition Laws' 4

demonstrate the desire of juries to expand their reach beyond factual questions and to address the law itself. Even in the absence of
dramatic political or moral issues the everyday jury occasionally
"acquits the defendant in protest against a police or prosecution
practice that it considers improper." 150
The continued use of general verdicts indicates that the judiciary is not totally committed to the premise that the jury exists
only to determine "Whodunnit?" If the jury functions only to resolve factual disputes, the jury should be instructed to return
special findings, and the trial judge should direct verdicts of guilty
whenever reasonable jurors could not disagree on the facts. 51 The
146. John Adams stated the democratic principle that "the common people ... should
have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature. .. ." as they have with regard to other decisions of government. 2 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 253 (1850). See also JEFFERSON, supra note 12.
147. See, Note, The ChangingRole of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170 (1964). The Articles of Impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805 include Justice
Chase's denial of the jury's right to rule on the admissibility of evidence, and his refusal to
allow counsel to argue to the jury that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. S. BUTLER &
G. KEATINGE, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE (Evans ed. 1805). See generally Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIsT. 49 (1960).
148. See L. FRIEDMAN, THE WISE MINORITY 28-50 (1971). See also R. COVER, JUSTICE AcCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
149. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 291.
150. Id. at 319.
151. See United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970) (directed verdict of guilty
improper even where no issues of fact are in dispute). See also United States v. Davis, 413
F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1969); Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 and 172
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judiciary's toleration of general verdicts evidences acceptance of a
function for the jury beyond resolution of factual disputes. In
Duncan v. Louisiana1 52 the Supreme Court recognized the framer's
regard for the jury as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge."' 1 3 The concept of the jury as a check upon government power is more consistent with democratic theory and the
intent of the framers, 5 than is the view that the jury exists only
to determine "Whodunnit?" The jury's ability to check government power is obviously enhanced when the jury is invested with
the authority to determine law as well as to resolve factual
questions.
The troublesome aspect of the jury's determination of law is not
the role of the jury vis a vis government power, but rather how
such a role potentially conflicts with the individual defendant's
constitutional rights. Underlying the Sparf and Hansen decision is
the view that jury determination of law cannot be a one-way proposition. If the jury can overrule the judge to determine law adversely to the government, the jury must also be allowed to overrule the judge to determine law adversely to the defendant.'5 5
(1895)
152.
153.
154.

(dissenting opinion).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 156.
". . . in a representative government, there is no absurdity or contradiction, nor any
arraying of the people against themselves, in requiring that the statutes or enactments of the governments shall pass the ordeal of any number of separate tribunals,
before it shall be determined that they are to have the force of laws. Our American
constitutions have provided five of these separate tribunals, to wit, representatives,
senate, executive, jury and judges; and have made it necessary that each enactment
shall pass the ordeal of all these separate tribunals, before its authority can be established by the punishment of those who choose to transgress it. And there is no more
absurdity or inconsistency in making a jury one of these several tribunals, than there
is in making the representatives, or the senate, or the executive, or the judges, one of
them. There is no more absurdity in giving a jury a veto upon the laws, than there is
in giving a veto to each of these other tribunals. The people are no more arrayed
against themselves, when a jury puts its veto upon a statute, which the other tribunals have sanctioned, than they are when the same veto is exercised by the representatives, the senate, the executive, or the judge."
Scheflin, supra note 8,at 184 (quoting SPooERa, TRiAL BY JuRY 11-12 (1852)).
That the determination of a reasonable search is a matter of constitutional law, not legislative law, does not definitively prohibit jury participation in the determination. See text
accompanying note 180 infra.
155. 156 U.S. at 101. The jury serves as a safeguard against oppressive prosecutions only
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Thus, while allowing the jury to determine law might be seen as an
acceptable device for checking government power in a conflict between the judiciary and the jury, such a device may become unacceptable when the rights of the individual defendant are
considered.
To Justice Story the individual defendant had the right "to be
tried according to the law of the land, the fixed law of the land,
and not by the law as a jury may understand it, or choose from
'
wantonness or ignorance or accidental mistake, to interpret it."15e

Of course this statement begs the question for it presumes that the
judge not the jury decides what is the law of the land. The question of judicial supremacy cannot be resolved merely by invoking
the maxim that we are a government of laws, not a government of
men. 157 It is not a self-evident truth that we are a government of

laws when judges determine law, but become a government of men
when juries determine law. If juries constitute the rule of men because they decide cases on the basis of "random value judgments, 158 then the judiciary must lay claim to a superior basis of
decision.
There are those who look to the judiciary for "the right answer."1 9 But absent an agreed upon methodology for determining
the answer, we may more realistically look to the judiciary for consistent, principled answers. Judicial consistency in determining law
is a means of avoiding the randomness of juries which may treat
so long as the jury sides with the defendant against the government. If the community is
hostile to the defendant or his cause, the jury is more likely to side with the prosecution.
See Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. Ci. L. REV. 386 (1954).
When the community is hostile to the defendant, he looks to the judge for protection
against the jury. Although the judiciary sometimes performs no better than the jury in times
of panic or emergency, see Rostow, Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945), it is important to preserve the judiciary's role as a safeguard against arbitrary
jury power. See note 175 infra.
156. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.P. Mass. 1835).
157. "Judges are men, and their decisions upon complex facts must vary as jurors on the
same facts. Calling one determination an opinion and the other a verdict does not. . . make
that uniform and certain which from its nature must remain variable and uncertain." J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRmAL 180 (1949) (quoting an uncited New Hampshire decision). See
generally Fuller, Reason & Fiat in Case Law, 59 HRv.L. REv. 376 (1946), and K. DAvIs,
DIsCRETIONARY JUSTcE: A PREniMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969).
158. See Brown, Commentary, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 108, 111 (1969).

159. See generally Leedes, supra note 130, at 1378.
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similarly situated defendants differently. In Sparf and Hansen the
judiciary promises consistency and uniformity by determining law
according to settled, fixed, legal principles.160 Stripped of superficial references to the law/fact distinction and to law as the conclusion in a formal syllogism, Sparf and Hansen presents two basic
conflicts: (1) the defendant's right to uniformity and consistency in
the law weighed against the utility of the jury's determination of
law as a device for checking judicial power; and (2) the jury's uneven and unequal administration of justice versus "the orderly supervision of public affairs by judges."""" This latter conflict is in
part the age old conflict of law and equity, with law again emerging
victorious in Sparf and Hansen.
In light of the judiciary's inability to formulate settled, fixed, legal principles of fourth amendment law, 6 2 the benefits of judicial
consistency were overvalued in Sparf and Hansen. The Supreme
Court's present fourth amendment approach of case-by-case balancing more closely resembles the flexibility of equity than the formal, principled consistency of law. 16 3 A realistic valuation of the
consistency of current fourth amendment decisions might well tip
the scales in favor of the jury's determination of search and seizure
law, and lead to a reversal of Sparf and Hansen. However, in light
of Jackson v. Deno's1 " toleration of the jury's supplemental determination of the admissibility of a confession, recognizing a similar
supplementary determination of the reasonableness of a search
does not necessitate a reversal of Sparf and Hansen. The procedure proposed in this article does not attempt to shift search and
seizure questions from the exclusive domain of judges to the exclu160. 156 U.S. at 74.
161. Howe, supra note 33, at 615. See generally M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOr AND SOCIgry
(1954), who suggests that the judiciary and other personnel associated with the courts tend
to develop a subculture of their own. The legal norms that emerge from this subculture
derive more from the need for predictability and administrative convenience than from a
concern for equity.
162. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
163. The Court's balancing efforts do not conform "to the disciplined analytical method
described as 'legal reasoning,' through which judges endeavor to formulate or derive principles of decision that can be applied consistently and predictably. 446 U.S. at 634 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV..945 (1977).
164. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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sive domain of juries. In an attempt to accommodate aspects of
uniformity and flexibility both judge and jury are to be given a role
in determining search and seizure law. 165
C.

The Jury's Role

The Court has clearly reneged on Sparf and Hansen's promise
of uniformity and consistency when it determines the reasonableness of a search as if it were a jury, free to assess the unique aspects of an individual case and to decide "justice" in that particular case without any regard to general rules or principles."' 6 At
other times the Court has sought to inject uniformity into fourth
amendment law by treating all similarly situated defendants
alike.16 7 That the Court is hopelessly caught between the pulls of
and flexibility is illustrated in Pennsylvania v.
uniformity
16 8
Mimrnms.
In Mimms the Court was confronted with a police practice of
ordering "all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course
whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation."169 The
Court addressed this general practice and did not inquire as to
whether the individual police officer had any suspicion that the
170
particular motorist was likely to be armed and dangerous. In upholding the police practice the Court relied upon statistical evi165. What I propose in the fourth amendment context is what Paul Freund once proposed in the context of determining clear and present danger. "A double test. . ., one from
the general standpoint of legislative policy and the other from the standpoint of the acts of
these defendants." P. FRauND, SuPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 52 (Cohn ed. 1971).
166. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) in which Justice Rehnquist
stated:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general standard of
'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining whether searches and seizures meet the
standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very
little that has been said in our previous decisions.., and very little that we might
say here can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to evolve
some detailed formula for judging cases such as this.
167. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
168. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
169. Id. at 110.
170. The state conceded that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the
particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious
about his behavior." Id. at 109.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:791

dence which showed "that a significant percentage of murders of
police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops."' 1
The Court balanced the generalized government interest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists against the generalized privacy interests of motorists as a class. 17 2 In holding that all
motorists must obey an order to exit their autos after a lawful stop,
the Court attempts to treat all similarly situated defendants alike.
However, this uniformity was achieved by sacrificing all flexibility.
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent:
The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the arresting officer is so universal that his safety is always a reasonable justification for ordering a driver out of his car. The commuter on his way
home to dinner, the parent driving children to school, the tourist
circling the Capitol, or the family on a Sunday afternoon outing
hardly pose the same threat as a driver curbed after a high speed
chase through a high-crime area late at night. Nor is it universally
true that the driver's interest in remaining in the car is negligible. A
woman stopped at night may fear for her own safety; a person in
poor health may object to standing in the cold or rain; another who
left home in haste to drive children or spouse to school or to the
train may not be fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents no
possible threat of violence may regard the police command as nothing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority.
Whether viewed from the standpoint of the officer's interest in his
own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not being required to obey
an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that 7 the millions of
traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible.1 3
Justice Steven's preference for an "individualized inquiry into
the particular facts justifying every police intrusion' '

74

is the ulti-

mate in flexibility and reflects a traditional concern for adjudicative facts instead of legislative facts such as the statistical evidence
cited by the majority. Such an approach does not fully consider the
171. Id. at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).
172. In its haste to balance the "de minimus" privacy interest of motorists against the
weighty interest in police safety, the Court did not pause to give serious consideration to the
"scope" question of whether the order to exit the vehicle constituted a seizure under the
amendment. See text following note 116 supra.
173. 434 U.S. at 120-21.
174. Id. at 116.
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institutional role of the Supreme Court. The Court controls its own
docket and is free to choose the particular factual situations in
which to interpret law. The Court's prime institutional task is to
deal with issues of significant public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties of the relatively rare case in which
certiorari has been granted.175 The fourth amendment cases
granted review are best seen as vehicles for broad policy statements designed to guide lower courts, prosecutors, defense counsel,
and, most importantly, the police.17 When the Court abandons
Sparf and Hansen's promise of determining law according to general principles in favor of unstructured, ad hoc balancing of the
total circumstances of the particular case, the Court leaves us with
murky law for this day and this case only. 177
The Court's role in dealing with broad policies and general rules
necessarily conflicts with its role of protecting the rights of individual citizens. 7 8 Justice Stevens is obviously correct in asserting that
175. "A court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned with
the correctness of the judgment below," rather "review is generally granted only if a case
raises an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential importance or conflicts with
controlling precedent." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977). See also Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
176. See generally Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the FourthAmendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973).
177. "If the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of them is
constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy will be hard to
draw and even harder to maintain." R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 197 (1976). See,
e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), where the dissentors characterize the case
as "a strange and particular one," and draw comfort from their belief "that sound Constitutonal precepts will survive the result the Court reaches today." 447 U.S. at 666 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIOUSLY (1977) and R. NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

(1974) both of which discuss the role of the judiciary in protecting

individual rights even when utilitarian balancing might require sacrificing those rights for
the common good. On a less theoretical level, the Maryland experience is again relevant. See
text accompanying note 75 supra. Prior to amendment in 1950, the Maryland constitution's
recognition of the jury as the final judges of law precluded appellate review of the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. A defendant who suffered disfavor with the jury could not look
to the judiciary for protection even when there was an "absolute failure of legal evidence to
justify a conviction. . . ." Markell, supra note 74, at 81. In 1950, art. XV, § 5 of the Maryland constitution was amended to read: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be
the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction." The Maryland experience demonstrates the importance of the judiciary as a safeguard against irresponsible juries. In arguing for a supplemental jury determination of reasonable searches, this article does not seek to diminish the role
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individual defendants do not regard themselves as fungible items
to be manipulated for the general good of society. 179 But it is im-

possible for the Court to maintain its institutional concern for general principles while remaining totally responsive to the peculiarities of each case. All individuals and all fourth amendment cases
are somewhat unique, just as they all share certain common characteristics. As Professor Amsterdam succinctly put it: "any number
of categories, however shaped, is too few to encompass life and too
many to organize it manageably. The question remains at what
level of generality and in what shape rules should be designed in
order to encompass all that can be encompassed without throwing
organization to the wolves."180
The conflicting benefits of uniformity and flexibility can best be
achieved if the Court shares with the jury the determination of a
reasonable search. The jury is traditionally concerned with the
"justice" of a particular case without undue regard for general
rules. In situations such as Mimms the judiciary could continue to
apply the general rule that it is reasonable for police to protect
themselves by ordering motorists to exit their automobiles. But a
jury would be free to consider whether it was reasonable to require
a particular pajama clad, elderly, invalid person to exit his or her
auto on a cold, dark, rainy night after committing the heinous offense of failing to signal a left turn. Should the jury find the police
conduct unreasonable under such circumstances, no great harm is
done to the general rule. The broad guidelines for police would be
preserved without sacrificing the privacy of all motorists to the
quest for uniformity. An acceptable compromise would be reached
between a government of law and law as tempered by individual
justice.
That the jury is interpreting constitutional law in determining
the reasonableness of a search should not be a definitive prohibition. When the Court removed the facade of legal formalism in
of the judiciary in protecting individual rights. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
179. "Without individuality, there is no function for privacy. When we become fungible

goods to be manipulated by government, there can be no recognition of idiosyncracies, no
private realms to husband against intrusion." Kuridand, The PrivateI, THF U. CHi. MAGAZINE 7, 36 (Autumn 1976).

180. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MeINN. L. REV. 349, 377

(1974).
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favor of a balancing approach,"'1 the Court weakened its position
as sole arbiter of the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
The Court currently determines the reasonableness of a search by
deciding what is a reasonable, justifiable, and legitimate expectation of privacy in our society,18 2 and what degree of protection is

afforded to these expectations. The Court has no inalienable right
to make such determinations. "The governing principle" is that
such determinations "should be entrusted to whoever can do the
job better. Is it more appropriate for an expert trained in the law
or for twelve representatives of the community?"183
To the extent that the expression "reasonable expectation of privacy" connotes common sense and community consensus,"" it is
suggested that the jury can "do the job better." If one must speak
in the traditional terminology of questions of fact and questions of
law, the jury can be seen as fulfilling its traditional fact finding
function in determining what expectations of privacy are currently
held by the reasonable member of the community. To paraphrase
Justice Hand, the jury would "indicate the present critical point in
the compromise between [privacy and order] at which the community may have arrived here and now."18 5 Thus in defining reasonable expectations of privacy the jury would merely describe the existing social compromise, and would not prescribe some ideal
compromise.
The jury's role in determining justifiable and legitimate expec181. Nineteenth century legal formalism in America was exemplified by the view that
adjudication proceeds by deduction from virtually absolute legal principles rooted in
natural law and enshrined in both the common law and the Constitution. Critics of
turn-of-the-century jurists have used the term formalism primarily in reference to the
'mechanical' methods and pretensions to objectivity with which the old Supreme
Court invoked these unchallenged premises in resolving legal disputes, as distinguished from the modern technique of weighing social policies and assessing all the
facts and circumstances surrounding a particular case to determine the most just or
socially desirable outcome.
Note, Formalism,Legal Realism and ConstitutionallyProtectedPrivacy Under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HAv. L. REV. 945, 948 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
182. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
183. CHAFEE, supra note 139, at 503.
184. "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
185. United States v. Kennedy, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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tations of privacy is more troublesome as such determinations go
beyond an examination of what is usually done in the community
and require value judgments and political choices about what
ought to be done.1 86 The selection of justifiable and legitimate expectations of privacy is an attempt to make a "social judgment"
about the desired compromise between privacy and order. Under
our republican form of government, the "job" of making binding
social judgments cannot be assigned according to technical expertise. Assuming that the Court is expert in formal logic or legal reasoning does not justify the current practice of investing the judiciary with exclusive authority to make the underlying value
judgments to which legal reasoning can be applied. 187 Nor would
an exclusive jury prerogative to make such judgments be justified
by empirical evidence that the jury best reflects existing community consensus. 188 In line with the Madisonian attempt to disperse
government power among separate entities, no one decision maker
should be entrusted with exclusive authority to make such "social
judgments." Thus this article proposes that the judiciary share
with other entities its authority to define reasonable searches.
While this article has focused on a role for the jury in determining
reasonable searches, the jury is best seen as part of a three tier
decision making process which recognizes a role for juries, courts,
and law enforcement administrators. These entities must all perform the "job" of making social judgments about reasonable
searches, but each entity is to be assigned responsibility to perform
that aspect of the "job" that it can do best.'8 9
186. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 177. For a broad perspective on defining and
identifying societal values and the "Moral Order" in our society, see, Schwartz, Moral Order
and Sociology of Law: Trends, Problems, and Prospects, 4 ANN. RIv. SocIAL. 577 (1978).
187. Formal logic or legal reasoning assists the Court in connecting premises to conclusions, but reason is inherently an empty source which does not suggest the first premise.
The Court's difficulty lies in identifying the first premise, the fundamental value embodied
in the fourth amendment.
188. The most fundamental objection to interpreting the fourth amendment according to
popular consensus is that such an approach conflicts with the role of the Constitution as a
safeguard against the potential tyranny of the popular majority. The majority consensus
cannot be employed as a vehicle for protecting individuals from the dictates of the majority.
See generally Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. R v. 1, 52 (1978).
189. However sophisticated the decision making process, the process must begin with
some fundamental judgments on the nature of privacy and order in society. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
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The model of fourth amendment decision making proposed here
resembles an inverted pyramid with the Court functioning at the
highest level in addressing broad categories of conflict between privacy and order in society. The Court's balancing approach to the
fourth amendment is better suited to a high level of abstraction,
than to refined calculations in individual cases. In classifying police-citizen encounters, one could realistically expect the Court to
recognize broad categories such as border stops, stop and frisk,
search incident to arrest, and the like. One would not expect categories which distinguish between searches of purses, shopping
bags, briefcases, or duffel bags. Obviously, there is no magic number of correct categories, and the dividing line between categories
will always remain somewhat fuzzy. However, the dividing lines between categories can be more easily maintained than dividing lines
between individual fact situations. Thus the Court could better
achieve the goal of uniformity and consistency in law, the "job" it
can do best. 190
Whatever action the judiciary takes in recognizing categories of
reasonable searches, it is law enforcement agencies which must
function at the intermediate level of fourth amendment decision
making.191 Implementation of court decisions necessitates the formulation of law enforcement policy and administrative rules to
guide individual police officers. 9 2 Police agencies possess the expertise and practical experience necessary to refine each judicially
recognized category into meaningful guidance for patrolmen.193
190. Each judicially recognized category would also constitute an intermediate premise
from which principled analysis could evolve more specific rules. For the lower courts and

police administrators, intermediate premises cut the debate off short of first principles and
avoid turning every fourth amendment case into a battle over ultimate moral truths. See
generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for IntermediatePremises, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 986 (1967).
191. The general benefits of police administrative rule-making are explored elsewhere in
great detail. See K. DAvis, POLICE DISCRriON (1975); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575
(1972). Here, I merely consider the role of police administrators in determining reasonable
searches. See Amsterdam, supra note 180; LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus
"StandardizedProcedures".The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127.
192. See generally Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation:A Proposal For Improving Police Performance,65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967); Packer, Policing the Police:Nine Men Are
Not Enough, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 19.
193. Existing law enforcement policy does not emanate from the administrative level of
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This is the "job" that administrators can do best.""
At the lowest level of particularized fourth amendment decision
making, the jury would fulfill its traditional function of applying
general principles and guidelines to the facts of the specific case.
This is the "job" that the jury can do best. The jury would be free
to consider the type of detailed factual situations which could not
be considered by courts or police agencies, which in classifying factual situations into broad judicial categories or general administrative rules necessarily focus on certain common characteristics while
ignoring the unique aspects of particular situations. The jury
would put back into the decision making process the particularized
factual situations which were necessarily ignored in abstracting the
common characteristics for a judicial category or an administrative
rule. In addition, by focusing on justice in individual cases, the
jury would be reopening the dialogue over first principles regarding
privacy and order in society, 195 a dialogue which the Court and administrative officials had to cut short in the interests of providing
some uniformity and consistency in the administration of criminal
justice.
This proposed model of fourth amendment decision making recognizes a division of responsibility. The Court is primarily responsible for providing uniformity and consistency in the law. Police
the police hierarchy, but is made primarily by individual patrolmen who are "the least qualified." DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, supra note 191, at 165. Such policy is an amalgamation of
past practices, vague rules of thumb, racial and cultural stereotyping, and a great deal of
offhand guesswork about what the public really wants. Id. at 113. See also National Advisory Commission On Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: POLICE (1973); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, STANDARD 4.3 (1973).
194. Of course the formulation of law enforcement policy is no more an objective, valueneutral process than is the Court's recognition of general categories of reasonable searches.
In formulating policy and administrative rules police agencies must deal with those value
judgments and political choices not addressed by the Court. Present policy, and the underlying value judgments, are deliberately kept vague and invisible to avoid scrutiny and criticism. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, supranote 191, at 69. Formal recognition of administrative
policy formulation as a legitimate part of fourth amendment decision making would subject
the formulation of law enforcement policy to the controls and procedures normally applied
to administrative rulemaking.
195. Speaking in the context of resistance to the Vietnam War, one author suggested that

the jury is "a forum more immediately available-and less politically compromised-than a
ballot box." Thus society might best regard the jury as a means for "taking an issue back to
the public over the heads of public officialdom .... ." Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The
Prosecutionof War Resistors, 57 YALE REV. 481, 494 (1968).
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administrative officials are primarily responsible for developing
clear rules readily understood by line officers. The jury is primarily
concerned with individual justice based on particular factual situations. While there is a division of responsibility in the proposed
model, there is also considerable overlap since the decision makers
must all address the basic issues of privacy and order in society.
This overlap is not a drawback to the model, but rather is an important benefit in that it affords an opportunity for formal interaction between the decisionmakers.1 96 For example, the jury could be
informed of the relevant administrative regulations and court decisions. 191 Such information would not limit the jury's authority, but
might help guide its discretion by acquainting the jury with the
general principles and rules selected by the other decision makers
who have considered fundamental questions of privacy and order
in society. In formulating regulations, police administrators would
benefit from court decisions which establish clearly defined categories that identify what is "settled" law and what areas permit an
exercise of discretion. The police would also benefit from an awareness that juries consistently approve or disapprove of certain types
of searches. The police could then adjust their regulations and actual practices in order to gain jury approval. 19 8 In rendering its decisions, the Court would benefit from the existence of specific administrative regulations. Such regulations free the Court from the
highly criticized practice of writing detailed law enforcement
manuals for police. 9 As it has in the death penalty cases, 0 0 the
196. See generally Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST
33 (spec. ed. 1965). The anthropologist Bohannan refers to the relationship of societal and
legal morality, and the interaction of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and citizens as a process of "double institutionalization."
197. In Maryland the courts have permitted liberal use of materials for enlightenment of
the jury. See Dillion v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976) (legislative preamble to a
criminal statute); Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 159 A.2d 844 (1960) (opinions of the appellate court); Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 26 A.2d 815 (1942) (legal textbooks).
198. When juries consistently refuse to convict for certain substantive offenses, prosecutors and police often abandon efforts to enforce such laws. See KALWvN & ZEISEL, supra note
1, at 310. If juries were to consistently disapprove of certain types of searches and seizures,
the police would have to adjust their practices in order to gain jury approval.
199. In United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971) the court reviewed a
police administrative rule and stated:
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Department put
into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scene identification confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged offense and in close
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Court would also benefit from some systematic accounting of juries' determinations of reasonable searches. Should juries in the aggregate decide uniformly regarding a type of search, for example,
suppression of all wiretap evidence, the juries would thereby indicate a prevailing moral consensus.
IV. CONCLUSION

The division of responsibility and the interaction in the proposed fourth amendment decision making process will not produce
the singular "right" answer regarding the balance of privacy and
order in society. However, the imperfect answers produced would
be a result of a decision making process which simulates the ideal
of participatory political decision making under our form of government. Within the context of fourth amendment decision making there would exist a role for the judiciary, the executive, and the
people as "represented" by the jury.20 1 The overlap and conflict
between the various roles will hopefully produce a formal dialogue
among the judiciary, the executive, and the people regarding the
proper accommodation of privacy and order in a democratic society. That there is merit in such dialogue rests upon "an instinctive
apprehension among a political people that there is usually much
to be said for both sides of a question, and that further knowledge
2
may reconcile the seemingly incompatibles. ' '20
V.

203
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CRITICS: PAST AND FUTURE

The process of fourth amendment decision making proposed in
proximity to the scene. We see in this regulation a careful and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a confrontation against its inherent
suggestiveness, and to balance both factors against the need to pick up the trail while
fresh if the suspect is not the offender. We see no need for interposing at this time
any more rigid time standard by judicial declaration.
200. For a discussion of the role of the aggregate decisions of juries in death penalty
cases, see Schwartz, supra note 186.
201. Juries are at beat an imperfect means of representation. See J. VAN DYKE,JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977). But however imperfectly selected, the jury is a means of involving citizens as active participants in the evolution of a proper balance between privacy and
order in a democratic society.
202. Fuller, supra note 157, at 391.
203. The subject matter of this article was initially presented at a symposium on Law and
Morality, sponsored by the Utah Endowment for the Humanities (Oct. 1980). The symposium presentation emphasized the sociological aspects of this subject, and has been pub-
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this article is not offered as the correct methodology, nor as the
constitutionally mandated process. I have presented a one-sided
case for jury determination of reasonable searches in order to suggest an alternative to the current practice of placing such determinations within the exclusive dominion of the judiciary. Just how
viable this alternative is will depend upon the reception this article
receives. Many who have examined drafts of this article have reacted with the statement: "The proposal is interesting, but it is not
practical. It just will not work." Here I briefly consider some of the
major points raised in opposition to my proposal.
A. "You cannot unring a bell which has been rung. The jury will
not disregard relevant evidence which it has heard."
I agree that it is usually preferable to have the judge initially
exclude inadmissible evidence rather than require the jury to disregard previously admitted evidence. My proposed model follows
this preference when. the judge determines that a search is unreasonable. 0 4 However, when the jury determines reasonableness, the
jury must hear the evidence before it can decide whether to disregard the evidence. Although it is difficult to disregard what has
been heard the law often requires the jury to perform just such
mental gymnastics. All limiting instructions are based on the assumption that the jury, at least to some extent, will be able and
willing to utilize evidence for a limited purpose.2 0 5 In addition
there is a very real difference between asking the jury to disregard
evidence which the judge determines to be inadmissible, and instructing the jury to disregard what they themselves have found to
be improper. I would not be surprised to learn that a jury which
finds a search to be improper would also be willing to disregard the
206
fruits of such impropriety.
lished under the title: The Jury as a Source of "Reasonable"Search and Seizure Law, 1980
B.Y.L. RE v. 739. The response to that presentation prompted this postscript.
204. See text following note 8 supra. See also Remius v. United States, 291 F. 501 (1923).
205. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1972).
206. I have no empirical evidence to support this observation, but I am not convinced
that there is much empirical evidence to support the assumption that juries generally ignore
limiting instructions and consider inadmissible as well as admissible evidence. There are
studies which suggest that in the proper setting a jury will endeavor to disregard inadmissible evidence. See Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions
of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. OF APPLIED SOC.' PSYCH. 345 (1973). Further
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B. "Juriesvote their instincts, not their heads. If the defendant
was caught (reasonably or unreasonably) with drugs, the jury is
not going to have much sympathy for his right of privacy."
My own instincts tell me that "drug pushers" will probably receive little sympathy from juries. However, the question of privacy
rights does not always arise in relation to dangerous crimes or unsympathetic defendants. Even if there is no sympathy for drug
pushers arrested or searched without probable cause, there may
well be community concern when police peer through cracked window curtains into a marital bedroom; 20 7 when police utilize stop
and frisk tactics as a means of harassing blacks; 28 or when the
government monitors political gatherings. 20 9 In such situations the

community, through the jury, might well concern itself with protecting privacy regardless of the defendant's obvious factual
guilt.2 10 The history of jury nullification demonstrates that if the

issue is sufficiently important, the jury will look beyond the guilt
or innocence
of the particular defendant and speak to the law
itself.21 '
C. "The proposal would permit different constitutional standards of reasonableness to apply in various communities. Travel
from New York to California would involve not only traveling
through different time zones, but also traveling through different
zones of recognized privacy."
I agree that uniformity, consistency and predictability are
proper goals of the law and should be pursued by the judiciary.
However, flexibility and individualized justice are also proper goals
empirical research is needed, and at this point I am not willing to concede that my proposal

is unworkable because juries would never disregard the evidence produced by an illegal
search.
207. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court alluded to the type of
police practices which would be required to enforce a prohibition against the use of
contraceptives.
208. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
209. In Donohue v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308, 309 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court stated: "it
has long been the policy in Richmond and other places throughout the nation to photograph
persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities whether
peaceful or otherwise."
210. KALWIN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 319.
211. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
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which can only be achieved by sacrificing some uniformity. In al-

lowing the jury the flexibility to pursue individual justice my proposal theoretically 212 decreases the amount of uniformity that exists in interpreting the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
Of course my proposed model of fourth amendment decison making is not unique in diminishing the uniformity of a constitutional
standard. For example, determining obscenity according to community standards reduces uniformity. However, I do not wish to
link my proposal to acceptance of the Court's current approach to
obscenity. Unlike the determination of obscenity, my proposal allows the jury to increase but not decrease individual rights. 1 3
Thus, it would not upset me to know that in traveling through
Utah I might temporarily enjoy more privacy than I did when I left
New York, and more privacy than I will enjoy when I reach California. At present I can enjoy greater protection of privacy interests in those jurisdictions which have increased privacy rights by
legislation or state constitution.2 14 If it is accepted that at times
the reasonableness of a search must be determined by examining
the totality of the circumstances and if it is accepted that the jury
is capable of considering the total circumstances of the case, then
it is irrelevant that the jury may interpret the law more expan212. In practice, there is little uniformity in the Court's current approach to reasonable
searches. See note 128 supra.
213. See note 9 supra. It can be argued that my proposal could in fact decrease privacy
rights by allowing a trial judge to "pass the buck" to the jury on close questions of law. See
Jackson v. Deno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In theory my proposal does not permit the judge to
abdicate his responsibility to make an independent determination of the reasonableness of a
search. In practice, trial judges being human, there may be a temptation to let the jury
decide close questions of reasonableness. However, given the present uncertainty of fourth
amendment law, a trial judge who is inclined to avoid a difficult decision might well "pass
the buck" to the appellate courts. There is a familiar maxim which encourages trial judges
to resolve questionable facts in favor of the defendant, but to resolve close questions of law
in favor of the government because the defendant can have the legal ruling reviewed on
appeal. In short, a judge inclined to assume responsibility is not likely to defer to the jury,
and a trial judge inclined to rule in favor of the government in order to have the jury decide
the issue, is the same judge who would probably rule in favor of the government in order to
have the appellate court ultimately decide the issue.
214. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 19 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975) (interpreting the California constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
as prohibiting the type of search approved in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973)). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 H~Av. L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
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sively than does the judiciary.2 1 5

On a more fundamental level, I would turn this concern for uniformity back upon my critics by asking: "What is the necessity of a
single uniform rule in a federal system?" The Supreme Court presently tolerates some variety among the states in dealing with open
ended constitutional concepts like obscenity, 216 cruel and unusual
punishment, 217 and due process. 218 Why is the concept of reasonable searches any less open ended and any less amiable to alternative interpretations, at least so long as those interpretations fall
within the broad perimeters set by the Court? The view that the
"benefits" of uniformity outweigh the "benefits" of diversity is of
relatively recent vintage in fourth amendment jurisprudence. It
has been only twenty years since the Court reversed the Wolf v.
Colorado219 decision to allow the states to experiment with alternatives to the exclusionary rule. My proposal represents a return to
the philosophy of encouraging experimentation by the states.
D. "Your proposalfocuses on the Supreme Court and its responsibility to address broad policy considerationsand to provide uniformity in the law. Where do the lower appellate courts and the
trial judges fit into your model of fourth amendment decision
making? Why cannot the trial judge provide the flexibility and
concern for individual justice which you would entrust to the
jury?"
For purposes of my analysis the difference between the Supreme
Court and the lower courts is a matter of degree, not a difference
in kind. The lower the court sits in the judicial hierarchy the more
the court is concerned with the result in a particular case and the
less it is concerned with broad principles. The higher the court sits
215. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) the Court held that a state court could not
interpret the federal constitution to conflict with prior Supreme Court interpretations. This
decision is defensible in that it demands uniformity in formalistic determinations by all
levels of the judiciary. But if it is accepted that the jury's determination of law serves the
goal of particularized justice, the holding of Oregon v. Hass should not be extended to the
jury's interpretation of the fourth amendment.
216. See Schauer, supra note 138.
217. See Schwartz, supra note 138.
218. See, e.g., Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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in the judicial hierarchy (and the more discretionary its review)
the more the court is concerned with broad principles and the less
it is concerned with the results in a particular case. To that extent
the Supreme Court is not free to render advisory opinions or postulate theory totally independent of the facts of the case, although
the court is frequently criticized for doing just that.220 Likewise, a

trial court is never totally free to concern itself with individualized
justice and ignore the fact that it is creating precedent.
I have emphasized the Supreme Court's role in formulating principles or policies which provide uniform guidance for lower courts,
but policy determinations do not originate in the Supreme Court
as if springing from some vacuum. Policy may be formulated by
articulating a general principle that embraces many ad hoc case by
case determinations. Policy determinations may also begin their
development in the lower courts and then flow upward to the Supreme Court where they are ultimately ratified or rejected. Thus,
while I perceive the lower courts to have more latitude than the
Supreme Court in addressing individual justice, all members of the
judiciary are never as free as a jury to disregard precedent setting
and broad principles in order to focus upon applying the law to
individual facts. This is not to say that the jury is just concerned
with gut reactions and emotional justice instead of being concerned
with the law. I have drawn a sharp line between jury nullification
and jury determination of law.221 The jury is to determine the law

in an individual case, and thereby put content into the open ended
legal concept of reasonable searches. To the extent that the content depends on value judgments, this is no more a gut reaction or
emotional decision than is the judiciary's attempts
to put content
222
searches.
reasonable
of
concept
legal
the
into
Thus, while I confess that my analysis has focused on the Supreme Court, I justify this by declining to draw a sharp line between the functions of the Supreme Court and the lower courts in
220. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) are
the classic examples of what some critics refer to as "judicial legislation."
221. See note 4 supra.
222. See text accompanying note 129 supra. Professor Amsterdam observed that interpretetion of the fourth amendment "is inescapably judgmental" and in "the pans of judgment
sit imponderable weights." Amsterdam, supra note 180, at 353-54.
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determining law. Perhaps the most striking part of my proposal is
that I suggest elimination of the line between the judiciary's and
the jury's ability to determine fourth amendment law. We should
conceptualize the legal determination of reasonable searches as a
continuum where all entities determine law. At one end of the continuum is the Supreme Court which is most concerned with broad
legal principles - the outer limits of law - and least concerned
with individual facts. While at the other end of the continuum is
the jury which has discretion to make particularized law in the individual case, so long as it stays within the confines of the outer
limits delineated by the courts. Trial judges and lower appellate
courts fall within the confines of this continuum where they also
exercise discretion, less than juries but more than higher appellate
courts, to render individualized justice. Thus, I do not deny that
trial judges, vis-A-vis Supreme Court Justices, may have more flexibility in adjusting the law to an individual case. But, I do contend
that the jury has a unique opportunity and ability to adapt the law
to individual facts, and I suggest that this ability should be utilized
in determining reasonable searches.
E. "Why is your proposal a one-way street? If the defendant can
submit the reasonablenessof a search to the jury, why should the
government be denied this same option?"
There is one practical reason for allowing only the defendant to
submit the question of reasonableness to a jury. Probable cause for
a search or arrest often includes references to the defendant's prior
convictions and reputation for criminal activity. 22 3 To allow the
government the option of placing this information before the jury
gives the government an unfair advantage.2 24 The defendant
should control the decision to place such information before the
223. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
224. I have elsewhere expressed some confidence in the jury's ability to follow limiting
instructions. See text accompanying note 204 supra. Total commitment to this principle
would mean that a jury might be instructed to consider the defendant's reputation as it
bears upon probable cause, while disregarding reputation for all other purposes. In distinguishing between the jury's ability to disregard the fruits of a search it has found unreasonable, and the jury's ability to disregard the defendant's prior convictions and reputation, I
draw a line which stops short of total faith in limiting instructions. I do not believe the line
is wholly arbitrary but rather takes account of considerations far beyond fourth amendment
concerns.
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jury, just as the defendant now controls the decision to make his
character an issue of the case and controls the decision to testify
and thereby allow evidence admitted as to his prior convictions.
On the more theoretical level, the defendant is given the exclusive option to submit the issue of reasonableness to the jury because in individual cases the jury represents the only effective safeguard against a possible abuse of judicial power.225 Protection
against governmental abuse of power is a major theme of the
fourth amendment 226 and the judiciary often utilizes the fourth
amendment to check legislative and executive power.227 While preserving the judiciary's role in checking the exercise of power by the
other branches of government my proposal assigns the jury the responsibility to guard against a potentially insensitive and insulated
judiciary. Creating this additional limitation on government power
does not necessitate recognizing a reciprocal benefit for the
government.
The jury also exists to protect the individual against a formalistic application of law which may conflict with justice as determined by twelve representatives of the community. Whether the
question of reasonable searches be categorized as a question of
substantive or procedural justice, my proposal allows the defendant a final appeal to the jury as the ultimate arbiter of individualized justice. A government subject to the rule of law, however,
should not have recourse to the conscience of the community (the
jury) in order to overturn unfavorable but formalistically correct
determinations of law. When the jury is seen as the individual defendant's final protection against legal formalism and abuse of government power, it is not inequitable to permit the defendant to
have access to the jury's determination of fourth amendment law
225. Of course the judiciary has internal safeguards against the abuse of power as when
an appellate court reverses a lower court. But except for executive pardon, there is no exter-

nal check upon the exercise of judicial power in individual cases.
226. See Amsterdam, supra note 180.

227. See for example the famous statement of Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948):

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
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while limiting the government to principled and consistent rulings
from the judiciary.
I am sure that I have neither anticipated nor satisfactorily rebutted all of the criticisms that can be properly directed at my
proposed model of fourth amendment decision making. But my intent was not to produce a polished model ready for legislative enactment. I have previously noted that traditional fourth amendment analysis has become stagnant 228 and that "if we would have
new knowledge, we must get us a whole world of new questions. ' 22
Here I have raised some new questions about fourth amendment
decision making in the hope that these questions will stimulate
consideration of needed reforms.

228. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 94.
229. S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY, 13 (3d ed. 1978).

